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Abstract
We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard
two-country perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product
and factor markets aﬀects the ownership structure of ﬁrms. In our model, managers decide
whether or not to integrate their ﬁrms, trading oﬀ the pecuniary beneﬁts of coordinating
production decisions with the private beneﬁts of operating in their preferred ways. The
price of output is a crucial determinant of this choice, since it aﬀects the size of the pecuniary
beneﬁts. Organizational choices also depend on the terms of trade in supplier markets,
which aﬀect the division of surplus between managers. We show that, even when ﬁrms
do not relocate across countries, the price changes triggered by liberalization of product
markets can lead to major organizational restructuring within countries. Moreover, the
removal of barriers to factor mobility can induce both ineﬃcient mergers and ineﬃcient
outsourcing, adversely aﬀecting consumers in all countries.
JEL classiﬁcations: D23, F13, F23.
Keywords: Firms, Organization, Contracts, Trade, Factor Mobility.
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Recent decades have witnessed drastic reductions in barriers to commodity trade and factor
mobility around the world. Whether the result of liberalization policies — exempliﬁed by the
proliferation of regional trade agreements and by successive rounds of multilateral trade nego-
tiations — or falling transport costs, the transformation of economic life has been dramatic.
There is ample evidence that increased international competition in product and factor markets
has contributed signiﬁcantly to widespread organizational restructuring, most notably in the
large — mergers and outsourcing — but also in the small — changes in reporting structures or
compensation schemes.1 Yet the mechanisms by which changes in the global economy can eﬀect
changes in the organization of ﬁrms are not well understood.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to that understanding by studying how liberalization
of trade in goods as well as factors can aﬀect ﬁrms’ integration decisions. Our analysis will show
that those organizational responses may in turn have signiﬁcant eﬀects on prices, quantities, and
consumer welfare, in ways that would not be expected based on traditional trade theory. For
example, the removal of barriers to factor mobility, by changing the terms of trade in supplier
markets, can lead to ineﬃcient reorganization of ﬁrms, with the potential of adversely aﬀecting
consumers in all countries.
As with other papers in the recent literature on organizations in the international economy
(e.g., McLaren, 2000; Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Antras, 2003), we depart from the tradi-
tional trade framework by opening the “black box” of the neoclassical ﬁrm. We start from a
simple model of organizational design in which a ﬁrm’s decision whether to integrate its pro-
duction activities depends on two key variables: the price at which its product is sold, and the
terms of trade prevailing in its supplier market. We embed this model of the ﬁrm in a perfectly
competitive, speciﬁc-factor model of international trade, in which trade between countries results
from diﬀerences in their factor endowments. The only signiﬁcant departure from the standard
framework is that the factors of production are supplier ﬁrms that are run by managers. The
model provides a tractable analytical framework in which the eﬀects of falling trade barriers on
organization can be grasped by simple demand and supply analysis.
Intuitively, there are good reasons to believe that trade liberalization ought to have an im-
pact on the internal organization of ﬁrms. In general, organizational design mediates trade-oﬀs
between organizational goals, such as proﬁt, and private, non-contractible ones such as manage-
1For example, the restructuring of US automakers’ relations with their suppliers in the 1980s has been at-
tributed largely to increased competition from Japanese imports and to some extent to the entry of foreign manu-
facturers into US supplier markets (Dyer, 1996). Various studies have also found strong correlations between the
creation of regional trade agreements and levels of M&A and other organizational restructuring activities within
as well as across member countries (e.g., Breinlich (2008) and Guadalupe and Wulf (2008) on the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement; European Commission (1996) on the EU Single Market; Chudnovsky (2000) on
the Mercosur customs union in Latin America). Other studies have stressed the impact of trade liberalization
on the reallocation of resources across individual plants and ﬁrms (e.g., Pavcnik, 2002; Treﬂer, 2004) or in work
practices (Schmitz, 2005).
1rial eﬀort or vision. For instance, a downstream ﬁrm may vertically integrate with its supplier
because this forces better production coordination; this reorganization is not costless, since there
may be revenue losses due to inexpert decision-making by non-specialists who take control of the
upstream operations. Integration may be most valuable when proﬁtability is too low to attract
upstream and downstream managers away from indulging their private interests. Since proﬁts
depend on product price, changes in product markets (such as tariﬀ reductions) aﬀect the terms
of this trade-oﬀ and therefore lead to changes in the degree of integration. Similarly, the amount
of proﬁt that needs to be sacriﬁced by the ﬁrm as a whole in order to accommodate the private
beneﬁts of its stakeholders will be aﬀected by supplier market conditions; if these change (as
when capital is allowed to cross borders), so will organizational structure.
The basic “building block” model of organizational design we use to formalize this intuition
is one in which production requires the cooperation of two types of suppliers that can either inte-
grate or deal at arm’s length (non-integration). The production technology essentially involves
the adoption of standards: output (or, in an alternate interpretation, the likelihood that the
good produced will actually work) is highest when the two suppliers coordinate, i.e., adopt sim-
ilar decisions about their production standards. However, managers have opposing preferences
about the direction those decisions ought to go, and ﬁnd it costly to accommodate the other’s
approach.2 Under non-integration, managers make their decisions separately, and this may lead
to ineﬃcient production. Integration solves this problem by delegating the decisions rights to an
additional party, called headquarters (HQ), who is motivated solely by monetary concerns. HQ
therefore maximizes the enterprise’s proﬁt by enforcing common standards between suppliers.
However, integration is also costly, since HQ’s relative lack of expertise or its own operating
costs will reduce output.3
In this setting, the price of output is a crucial determinant of ﬁrms’ organizational choices. In
particular, non-integration is chosen at “low” and “high” prices: at low prices, managers do not
value the increase in output brought by integration, since they are not compensated suﬃciently
for the high costs they have to bear; at very high prices, non-integration performs well because it
avoids the costs of HQ, while managers value output so much that they are willing to concede to
each in order to achieve coordination. Therefore, integration only occurs at intermediate prices.
The ownership structure of ﬁrms will also be aﬀected by the terms of trade in the supplier
markets, which determine the division of surplus between managers. Relative to non-integration,
integration is more ﬂexible in its ability to distribute surplus between suppliers — since they do
not make decisions, the proﬁt shares they receive have no incentive eﬀects — and will therefore
2The model is a variant— developed in Legros and Newman (2008) — of the one in Hart and Holmstr¨ om
(2002). These papers are part of a literature pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)
that identiﬁes a ﬁrm’s boundaries with the extent of decision rights over assets and/or operations.
3Thus our model is consistent with the classic view of integration as the result of a tradeoﬀ between spe-
cialization and coordination. But it also reﬂects the perspective expressed by Grossman and Hart (1986) that
integration does not so much remove incentive problems as replace one incentive problem with another. The
costs of integration are therefore unlikely to be ﬁxed and will depend instead on prices, the level of output, etc.
2tend to be adopted when the supplier market strongly favors one side or the other.
We consider the eﬀects of the successive liberalization of product and factor markets and
obtain two main results. First, even when supplier ﬁrms do not relocate across countries (i.e.,
there is no “oﬀshoring”), freeing trade in goods triggers price changes that can lead to signiﬁcant
organizational restructuring within countries. In particular, our analysis predicts that large price
changes will induce major reorganization across ﬁrms (waves of mergers and divestitures), while
smaller price changes will typically lead to less dramatic reorganization within ﬁrms (changes in
managers’ compensation schemes).
Second, following the liberalization of product markets, the removal of barriers between sup-
plier markets and the resulting factor movements (international migration ﬂows and international
capital movements) can induce further organizational changes. We show that this restructuring
can actually lead to an increase in the price of goods (or a decrease in their quality) and ad-
versely aﬀect consumers in all countries. These negative eﬀects will tend to result from a shift
toward integration in Home (the country with the more productive suppliers) and a shift toward
outsourcing in Foreign. Our ﬁndings are consistent with recent evidence of supply disruptions
and quality losses resulting from recent waves of mergers in countries like the United States and
Japan (Accenture, 2007), or of productivity losses in ﬁrms outsourcing to China (Lin and Ma,
2008). Notice that, since we focus on perfectly competitive product and factor markets, the
negative impact on consumer welfare arises solely from ineﬃcient organizational choices, rather
than from any market power eﬀects.
Our analysis also suggests that the removal of both barriers to commodity trade and factor
mobility should lead to international convergence of organizational choices, i.e., a tendency of
industries to be characterized by the same ownership structure across countries. This convergence
in corporate organization has its source not in global cultural transmission or technological
diﬀusion, but in standard neoclassical market forces, namely the law of one price. The trend
should therefore be most apparent in trade exposed sectors, and within regional trade agreements
such as the EU, in which the integration of the members product and factor markets has been
“deeper.”
Our paper contributes to an emerging literature on general equilibrium models with endoge-
nous organizations,4 and in particular to a recent stream of this literature which has examined
ﬁrms’ organizational choices in a global economy. Most papers have focused on how organiza-
tional design can explain the observed patterns of intra-ﬁrm trade.5 Much less attention has been
4General equilibrium models of an industry have been used to describe how ﬁrms’ organizational choices are
aﬀected by wealth distributions and relative scarcities of supplier types (Legros and Newman, 1996) and search
costs (McLaren, 2000; Grossman and Helpman, 2002).
5Antras (2003) embeds a hold-up model of organization in a two-country international trade model with
monopolistic competition, and is mostly concerned with explaining location decisions of multinational ﬁrms and
the patterns of intra-ﬁrm trade; it does not examine organizational responses to the liberalization of product and
factor markets, which is our focus. Antras and Helpman (2004) and Grossman and Helpman (2004) study models
in which ﬁrms choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers; however there
3devoted to how ﬁrms’ boundaries respond to falling trade costs.6 Nor to our knowledge has the
previous literature pointed out the potential negative eﬀects that trade liberalization can have
on consumer welfare — even absent market power — through its impact on the organization of
production.
In the next section, we describe organizational choices in a closed economy. Section 3 extends
the model to two countries and examines the eﬀects of the liberalization of the markets of ﬁnal
goods on the ownership decision and on managers’ compensation schemes. Section 4 considers
the impact of the liberalization of supplier markets and its eﬀects on consumers’ welfare. Section
5 discusses the empirical implications of our theoretical model. Section 6 concludes discussing
the policy implications of our analysis.
2 The Model
Our model is similar to a standard speciﬁc-factor trade model between two countries, Home and
Foreign (denoted with a “*”), in which trade is the result of diﬀerences in the endowments of
speciﬁc factors. In this section, we describe its building blocks in its closed-economy form. The
eﬀects of integrating goods and factor markets are studied in the following two sections.
2.1 Setup
In each economy, there are I + 1 sectors/goods, denoted by 0 and i = 1,...,I; good 0 is a
numeraire. The representative consumer’s utility (which is the same in Home and Foreign) can
be written as




where c0 represents the consumption of the numeraire good, and ci represents consumption of
the other goods. The utility functions ui(·) are twice diﬀerentiable, increasing, strictly concave,
and satisfy the Inada conditions limci→0 u′
i(ci) = ∞ and limci→∞ u′
i(ci) = 0. Domestic demand
for each good i can then be expressed as a function of its own price alone, Di(pi).
Production of good i requires the cooperation of two types of input supplier, denoted A and
Bi. Bi suppliers generate no value without being matched with an A; A suppliers can instead
engage in stand-alone production of the numeraire good 0. Many interpretations of the A and
B ﬁrms are possible. For example, A ﬁrms may represent light assembly plants or some basic
is no analysis of either the positive or welfare eﬀects of product and factor market integration.
6An exception is Marin and Verdier (2002), which examines how trade integration aﬀects the delegation of
authority within monopolistically competitive ﬁrms in which managers cannot be given monetary incentives.
Ornelas and Turner (2008) and Antras and Staiger (2008) examine how trade liberalization may mitigate hold-up
problems by strengthening foreign suppliers’ investment incentives.
4inputs, such as energy or various business services (e.g., IT, retailing, logistics), which can be
used to produce basic consumer goods or can be combined with other inputs (Bi suppliers) to
produce more complex goods.
All goods are sold under conditions of perfect competition. Good 0 is always traded freely
across the two countries. We choose units so that the international market-clearing and domestic
price of good 0 are both equal to unity, and we assume that aggregate supply of A’s is large
enough to sustain production of a positive amount of this good.
So far, we have described a standard speciﬁc-factor model, in which A supplier ﬁrms represent
the mobile factor, while Bi ﬁrms are the speciﬁc factor of production. As discussed in Section
2.3 below, the crucial novelty of our model is that production inputs are run by managers,
who trade oﬀ the pecuniary beneﬁts of coordinating their decisions with the private beneﬁts of
making these decisions in their preferred way.
2.2 Equilibrium in the factor market
In the supplier market, there is a large number of A ﬁrms and B ﬁrms. Normalize the measure
of A ﬁrms to unity, and denote by ni the measure of Bi ﬁrms; let
PI
i=1 ni ≡ nB < 1. We will
consider equilibria with full employment of factors, i.e., the sum of A and B ﬁrms used in the
production of the I + 1 goods equals the total endowment of ﬁrms in the economy.
An equilibrium in the supplier market consists of matches between each Bi ﬁrm and an A
ﬁrm, along with a surplus allocation among all the managers. Such an allocation must be stable,
in the sense that no (A,Bi) pair can form an enterprise that generates payoﬀs to each manager
that exceed their equilibrium levels. By construction, A ﬁrms are the long side of the market.
This implies that some A agents must remain unmatched and produce the numeraire good.
To derive an endogenous solution for the terms of trade in supplier markets, we shall assume
the following. All A’s are equally productive when matched with one of the Bi’s. However,
A suppliers have diﬀerent outside options, depending on their good-0 productivity: a stand-
alone A-ﬁrm can produce α units of the numeraire good, where α is distributed among the A
population according to the continuous distribution F(α).
Any unmatched A with an opportunity cost below that of a matched A would oﬀer the
matched A’s partner more than she is currently receiving. Thus, in a stable match, all matched
A’s receive the same equilibrium surplus, regardless of which industry i they are in. The equi-
librium surplus of the A’s, ˆ α, is such that7
F(ˆ α) = nB. (2)
7This is the relevant equilibrium condition only if A ﬁrms are the long side of the market. In turn, this requires
that all Bi ﬁrms obtain a positive surplus after paying ˆ α to their A suppliers. The Appendix discusses suﬃcient
conditions for this to be the case.
5As discussed in Section 2.3.3 below, ˆ α captures the terms of trade prevailing in the supplier
market, which play a crucial role in organizational choices. Notice that in equilibrium only the
A ﬁrms with the lowest opportunity cost will be matched with Bi ﬁrms to produce the i-goods,
while more productive A ﬁrms will produce good 0.
2.3 Individual ﬁrms
Our basic model of the ﬁrm shares two key features with the analysis of Hart and Holmstr¨ om
(2002). First, managers in each ﬁrm enjoy monetary proﬁts as well as private non-transferable
beneﬁts associated with the operations of the ﬁrm; diﬀerent managers view these operations dif-
ferently and so their private beneﬁts come into conﬂict. For instance, a standardized production
line could be convenient for the sectorally-mobile A suppliers, but may not ﬁt the speciﬁc design
needs of the Bi suppliers.8 Second, some ﬁrm decisions (e.g., choosing production techniques,
deciding on marketing campaigns, etc.) cannot be agreed upon contractually; only the right to
make them can be transferred through transfers of ownership.
Consider a ﬁrm composed of an A and a Bi. For each supplier, a non-contractible decision
is rendered indicating the way in which production is to be carried out. Denote the A and Bi
decisions respectively by a ∈ [0,1] and bi ∈ [0,1]. For eﬃcient production, it does not matter
which particular decisions are chosen, as long as there is coordination between the two suppliers.
More precisely, the enterprise will succeed with a probability proportional to 1 − (a − bi)2, in
which case it generates a unit of output; otherwise it fails, yielding 0. Output realizations are
independent across ﬁrms.
Overseeing each supplier ﬁrm is a risk-neutral manager, who bears a private cost of the
decision made in his unit. The A manager’s utility is yA − (1 − a)2, while the Bi manager’s
utility is yi − b2
i, where yA,yi ≥ 0 are their respective incomes; thus the managers disagree
about the direction in which decisions should go. Since the primary function of managers is to
implement decisions and convince their units to agree, they continue to bear the cost of decisions
even if they don’t make them.
While decisions themselves are not contractible, the right to make them can be contractu-
ally reassigned. Revenues generated by the ﬁrm are also contractible, which allows monetary
incentives to be created.
Managers can remain non-integrated, in which case they retain control over their respective
decisions. The success probability in this case is 1 − (a − bi)2. Alternatively, they can integrate
by engaging a headquarters (HQ), transferring to it the power to decide a and bi and a share
η of the realized revenue in exchange for a ﬁxed payment. HQ is motivated only by monetary
8Tensions about how a product should be produced could also arise because of the diﬀerent types of expertise
of the suppliers (e.g., engineering and marketing departments). Other papers (e.g., Van den Steen, 2005) have
stressed the importance for organization design of conﬂicting private beneﬁts stemming from diﬀerent corporate
cultures and/or managerial vision.
6considerations, and incurs no costs from the decisions a and bi; it will therefore wish to maximize
the income of the integrated ﬁrm. However, involving HQ entails a cost, modeled as a reduction σ
in the success probability. For simplicity, we will assume this cost to be the same for all i sectors.
The output loss σ might arise from direct costs of communication, additional management
personnel, or losses from delegating decisions from A and Bi to staﬀ who are not experts.
To summarize, each ﬁrm’s expected output is (1−(a−bi)2)(1−σI), where I is the integration
indicator function, equal to unity if there is integration, and zero otherwise.
Before production, Bi managers match with A managers, at which time they sign contracts
(s,I), where s ∈ [0,1] is the share of managerial revenue accruing to manager A, with 1−s going
to Bi (in case of failure each receives zero).
For each match (A,Bi), total revenue in case of success is given by the product market price,
pi, which is taken as given by ﬁrms when they take their decisions and sign their contracts. After
contract signing, managers (or HQ) make their production decisions, output is realized, product
is sold, and revenue shares are distributed.
2.3.1 Integration
HQ’s are elastically supplied at a cost normalized to zero. After paying its acquisition fee, an
HQ receives an expected payment proportional to (1−(a−bi)2)pi and therefore makes decisions
for both activities in order to maximize expected revenue of the integrated ﬁrm, that is, chooses
a = bi (thus if its revenue share is η, the fee is η(1 − σ)pi). Among the choices in which a = bi,
the Pareto-dominant one is that in which a = bi = 1/2, and we assume HQ implements this
choice. The cost to each supplier manager is then 1














Total managerial welfare under integration is
W
I




and is fully transferable via adjustments in s.
2.3.2 Non-integration
Under non-integration, each manager retains control of his activity. The decisions chosen are
the (unique) Nash equilibrium of the game with payoﬀs (1 − (a − bi)2)spi − (1 − a)2 for A and
7(1 − (a − bi)2)(1 − s)pi − b2















The resulting expected output is
Q
N
i (pi) = 1 −
1
(1 + pi)2, (6)
which is independent of s.
Output increases with the price: as pi becomes larger, the revenue motive becomes more
important for managers and this pushes them to better coordinate. Indeed, QN
i (0) = 0, and
QN
i (pi) approaches 1 as pi becomes unbounded. Thus, as long as σ > 0, there exists a price ˜ pi
at which output supplied to the product market under integration is equal to to that supplied
under non-integration: ˜ pi is the unique solution to
σ =
1
(1 + pi)2, (7)
that is, ˜ p =
q
1
σ − 1. Non-integration output is smaller than integration output for pi < ˜ p and
larger for pi > ˜ p.
































Observe that each manager’s payoﬀ is an increasing function of his share as well as of the product
price. Varying s, one obtains the Pareto frontier for non-integration. It is straightforward to
verify that this frontier is strictly concave and that the total managerial payoﬀ is W N
i (s,pi) =
QN
















2.3.3 Choice of organizational form
To determine the choice of organization that the managers make, we must combine the integra-
tion and non-integration frontiers to derive their overall Pareto frontier. The relative positions
8of the two frontiers depend on the price pi. When it is close to zero, non-integration dominates
integration: to verify this, notice from (3)-(4) and (8)-(9) that when pi = 0 integration yields
negative payoﬀs, while non-integration payoﬀs are bounded below by 0. The same is true for
pi suﬃciently large: to see this, it is enough to compare the minimum non-integration surplus,
p2
i
1+pi, with the integration surplus pi(1 − σ) − 1
2: for a suﬃciently large pi, the latter is smaller
as long as σ is positive. Finally, observe that with s = 1/2, W N(1
2,pi) > W I(pi) for all pi; thus
integration never dominates non-integration.
Figure 1 depicts the situation for intermediate ranges of prices, in which neither integration
nor non-integration dominates globally. Rather, the organization that managers choose depend
on where they locate along the Pareto frontier, i.e., on the terms of trade in the supplier market.





.9 In what follows, we will assume that σ is smaller than an upper bound








Recall from Section 2.2 that, for the factor market to be in equilibrium, all A ﬁrms matched
with a Bi ﬁrm must receive a surplus equal to ˆ α. Consider an A ﬁrm partnered with a Bi ﬁrm
when the product price is pi. To facilitate the characterization of equilibrium, we make the
following restriction on the surplus of A ﬁrms when matched with a Bi ﬁrm:






9These are the solutions to the (quadratic) equation WN(0,p) = WI(p), i.e.
p
2
1+p = p(1 − σ) − 1
2.




is increasing in p, this assumption ensures that A’s get less than half of the
surplus from producing good i for any price at which integration is not dominated as an orga-
nizational choice (i.e., in Figure 1, the surplus allocation will lie above the 45◦-line whenever pi
is above some threshold that is less than p).
From (8), there is a unique value of the output share, s(ˆ α,pi) that generates a payoﬀ equal to
ˆ α for A under non-integration; it is easy to verify that s(ˆ α,pi) is increasing in ˆ α and decreasing
in pi. If the payoﬀ that remains for Bi, namely W N(s(ˆ α,pi),pi) − ˆ α, exceeds W I(pi) − ˆ α, the
ﬁrm chooses non-integration. If instead W N(s(ˆ α,pi),pi) < W I(pi), the ﬁrm integrates.
It can be shown that there are at most two solutions to the equation W N(s(ˆ α,pi),pi) =
W I(pi) (from Footnote 9 this is clearly true for ˆ α = 0, since s(0,pi) = 0, but it extends to the





. In Figure 1, Bi is indiﬀerent between the two ownership structures if A
gets u1, but strictly prefers integration if A gets u0. Thus, if ˆ α were to be equal to u1, the product





It follows that, for values of ˆ α that correspond to frontier points above the 45◦-line, the set of
prices at which integration is preferred is strictly larger (in the set inclusion sense) when ˆ α falls.
The above discussion is summarized by (proof in Appendix):
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, (i) There exist at most two solutions p(ˆ α) and p(ˆ α) to the
equation W N(s(ˆ α,pi),pi) = W I(pi); (ii) p(ˆ α) is increasing, p(ˆ α) is decreasing.
Thus, when A’s share is not too large, a fall in ˆ α becomes a force for integration: starting
at a price just under p(ˆ α) (or just over p(ˆ α)), a decrease in ˆ α leads the ﬁrm to switch from
non-integration to integration.10
To sum up, there is a non-monotonicity of managers’ organizational preference in price. At
low prices, despite integration’s better output performance, revenues are still small enough that
the managers (particularly Bi’s) are more concerned with their private beneﬁts and so remain
non-integrated. At high prices, non-integration generates enough revenues that they do not want
to incur the cost piσ of HQ. Only for intermediate prices do managers prefer integration. In this
range, the Bi manager knows that revenue is large enough that under non-integration he would
be tempted to follow the A manager, who obtains little income from the ﬁrm and therefore
would choose a close to 1 (s is close to zero when the A’s share of surplus is small). Bi therefore
bears high private costs under non-integration, and prefers instead the relatively high revenue
and moderate cost that he incurs under integration.
10Relaxing Assumption 1 would not change the main results of our analysis, but would enrich the set of
comparative statics: if ˆ α were to exceed the critical threshold identiﬁed in Assumption 1, declines in ˆ α would
ﬁrst push toward non-integration (starting below the 45◦-line), then toward integration (once the 45◦-line has
been crossed).
102.4 Industry equilibrium and the OAS curve
Equilibrium in each industry comprises a general equilibrium of the supplier and product mar-
kets. In product market i, the large number of ﬁrms implies that with probability one, the supply
is equal to the expected value of output given pi; equilibrium requires that this price adjust so
that the demand equals the supply.
To derive industry supply, suppose that a fraction θi of ﬁrms in industry i are integrated,
while the remaining 1 − θi non-integrated. Total supply at price pi is then (recall ni is the
measure of Bi suppliers)








Now θi itself is a correspondence that depends on the product price pi and the terms of trade
between suppliers ˆ α. When pi < p(ˆ α), θi = 0 and total supply is just the output when all ni
ﬁrms choose non-integration, which is increasing in pi.11 At pi = p(ˆ α), θi can vary between
0 and 1, since managers are indiﬀerent between the two forms of organization. When θi = 1
output is (1 − σ)ni and stays at this level for all pi ∈ (p(ˆ α),p(ˆ α)). At pi = p(ˆ α), managers
are again indiﬀerent between the two ownership structures and θi can assume any value from
1 down to 0. Finally for pi > p(ˆ α), all ﬁrms remain non-integrated and output again increases
with pi. Of course, when the “integration range” [p(ˆ α),p(ˆ α)] is empty, managers always choose
non-integration and θi ≡ 0. Write S(pi, ˆ α) for the supply correspondence, the Organizationally
Augmented Supply (OAS) curve. The supply curve for a typical industry in which p(ˆ α) < p(ˆ α)
is represented in Figure 2. The dotted curve corresponds to what the industry supply would be
if no ﬁrms were integrated.
Given an equilibrium return of A equal to ˆ α, an equilibrium in the product market of good
i is a price and a quantity that equate supply and demand: Di(pi) = S(pi, ˆ α). There are three
distinct types of industry equilibria, depending on where along the supply curve the equilibrium
price occurs: those in which ﬁrms integrate (I), the mixed equilibria at the two prices p(ˆ α)
and p(ˆ α) in which there is coexistence of integrated and non-integrated ﬁrms (M), and a pure
non-integration equilibrium (N).12
Finally, the economy is in equilibrium when each industry is in equilibrium relative to the
(common) A-surplus ˆ α. Our assumptions ensure that such an equilibrium always exists.
11If pi is very low, then A’s would not be able to obtain ˆ α in partnership with a Bi; in this case, full employment
of the Bi’s could not be part of an equilibrium. The demand restrictions discussed in the Appendix rule out the
possibility that such low prices would obtain in equilibrium, so we ignore prices in this range in what follows.
12We have depicted the typical case of monotonic supply, where ˜ p ∈ [p(ˆ α),p(ˆ α)], which obtains when ˆ α is low
enough. Most of our results continue to hold in the alternate case (in which ˜ p > p(ˆ α) – see the remark following
the proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix), at the cost of some expositional complication. One can also extend the
model to the case in which the HQ’s vary in capability (1 − σ) and thereby obtain a single-valued supply with












Figure 2: Organizationally Augmented Supply
There are two comparative statics of the industry supply that are worth noting for our
analysis of trade liberalization in the next two sections. First, from Lemma 1, the “integration





expands as ˆ α falls and contracts as ˆ α rises. This implies that countries with a lower ˆ α will also
be characterized by a broader integration region. Second, an increase in ni leads the OAS curve
for good i to shift to the right. This implies that if a country has a larger measure of Bi ﬁrms,
its supply curve in that sector will be positioned to the right of the other country’s supply curve.
In the analysis presented in this section, we have focused on equilibria in product and factor
markets in a closed economy. This is equivalent to a scenario in which there are prohibitive
barriers to trade in goods and factor mobility between Home and Foreign. In the next two
sections, we will examine the impact of the successive removal of barriers to commodity trade
and factor mobility on organizational choices. This sequencing will allow us to separate the eﬀects
of the liberalization of goods markets from those induced by factor market liberalization; it also
reﬂects the experience of many regional trade agreements, in which policies aimed at improving
factor mobility have followed the removal of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers to commodity trade.
An example is provided by the process of European integration: free trade in goods among EU
member countries was achieved in 1968, with the the creation of the EEC customs union; free
mobility of capital and labor was only introduced in 1992, with the establishment of the Single
European Market.13
13Similar patterns can be observed at the multilateral level: since the creation of the General Agreement on
12We will focus on the organizational changes triggered by the full integration of product
and factor markets. Our analysis can be readily extended to the case of positive—but not
prohibitive—trade barriers, to examine the eﬀects of incomplete trade liberalization.
3 Liberalization of Product Markets
Let us assume that Home and Foreign have identical demands and identical technologies in the
production of all goods i = 1,...,I. Trade is the result of endowment diﬀerences between the
two countries, i.e., diﬀerences in the measure of Bi suppliers. In particular, we order the goods
so that ni < n∗
i for i ∈ {1,...,m} and ni > n∗
i for i ∈ {m + 1,...,I}. Ours is thus a standard
speciﬁc-factor trade model, in which A ﬁrms are the mobile factor and Bi ﬁrms represent the
speciﬁc factors. The main diﬀerence with the traditional formulation of this model (e.g., Mussa,
1974) is that all factors are supplier ﬁrms run by managers, who care about non-pecuniary eﬀects
of production decisions.
Under free trade, world markets for goods i ∈ {1,...,m} clear when
Mi(p
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where pw
i is the free trade equilibrium price, Mi(pw
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imports, and Xi(pw
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i ) + R0 = 0, (14)
where R0 denotes the net transfer of the numeraire good to settle the trade balance. A similar
condition must hold for the Foreign country.
To isolate the eﬀects of product market liberalization on organizational choices, we will shall
focus here on trading economies characterized by the same conditions in the supplier markets
(i.e., ˆ α = ˆ α∗). The role of factor market diﬀerences is considered in the Section 4 below.
Figure 3 depicts the autarky and free trade equilibria in a product markets i ∈ {1,...,m},
in which Home imports from Foreign. Consider ﬁrst the left panel of the Figure, which depicts
Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiation have led to the progressive
liberalization of product markets; the removal of barriers to factor mobility has only recently become part of the
agenda (e.g., the GATS and TRIMs agreements negotiated during the Uruguay Round).
13the Home country’s market. The intersection between the demand curve, Di = D(pi), and the
supply curve, Si = S(pi, ˆ α), determines the equilibrium autarky price, which is denoted by ˆ pi.
The graph on the right panel of Figure 3 depicts Foreign country’s market. Notice that, since
Foreign has a larger measure of Bi ﬁrms, its supply curve is positioned to the right of that of the
Home country. Given the assumption of identical demands, this implies a lower autarky price,
i.e., ˆ p∗
i < ˆ pi.
In the middle panel of Figure 3, we have drawn export supply and import demand functions
in the world market for good i. From condition (12) above, we can derive the equilibrium price
under free trade, pw
i . The move from autarky to free trade results in a price fall from ˆ pi to pw
i in
Home, and a price increase from ˆ p∗
i to pw
i in Foreign.
Free trade leads to price convergence across countries in all sectors. In the case of two
countries characterized by the same terms of trade between suppliers (ˆ α = ˆ α∗), the range of
prices for which ﬁrms will choice integration or non-integration is the same. This implies that
price convergence results in organizational convergence. In the case depicted in Figure 3, both
countries move from non-integration to integration.
Insofar as free trade in goods tends to move product prices away from the “extremes” to-
ward the middle, the model predicts a tendency toward widespread reorganizations in favor
of integration that may appear as shakeouts and consolidations in the face of increased foreign
competition. Such a conclusion comes with caveats, of course, since world prices need not always
end up in the integration region, and autarky need not have begun with non-integration.
More generally, our analysis suggests that, through their eﬀect on product prices, tariﬀ cuts
can give rise major reorganizations within countries (i.e., changes if ﬁrms’ ownership structure),
even when suppliers do not relocate across countries (no “oﬀshoring”). This implies that regional
trade agreements such as free trade areas or customs unions — in which member countries remove
all barriers to trade — should lead to waves of mergers and divestitures across diﬀerent industries.
Piecemeal tariﬀ reductions, however, will lead to reorganizations that are conﬁned to just the
aﬀected industries.14
Changes in ownership structure, induced by large price changes following tariﬀ liberalization,
are not the only organizational response predicted by the model. For smaller price changes, it
is likely that ﬁrms will remain in the price region they started in. But other organizational
variables, such as the “power” of compensation schemes (here represented by the size of the
proﬁt shares 1 − s and s), will change with prices. Indeed, as noted in the discussion leading
up to Lemma 1, A’s proﬁt share s declines for a non-integrated ﬁrm when the industry price
rises. In fact, it is easy to show that the same comparative static results holds for integrated
ﬁrms. Thus, following product market liberalization, if the ownership structure does not change
in industry i, the proﬁt shares accruing to Bi managers should increase if i is an export industry
14Obviously, trade liberalization in one sector could trigger organizational changes in other sectors if we relaxed







































Figure 3: Liberalization of product markets
1
5and fall if i is an import-competing industry. The reason is that free trade leads prices to rise in
the export industries and fall in the import industries. Of course, proﬁt shares will also change
when there are changes in ownership structure.
We summarize the previous discussion with
Proposition 1 Even in the absence of factor movements, the price changes triggered by the
removal of trade barriers can induce reorganizations within each country. Small price changes
typically induce within-ﬁrm restructuring (changes in compensation schemes) while large price
changes are more likely to lead to across-ﬁrm restructuring (changes in ownership structure).
Proposition 1 can help us to interpret the results of recent empirical studies of organizational
change in the face of the removal of tariﬀ barriers. In particular, it is instructive to compare
the ﬁndings in Breinlich (2008) and Guadalupe and Wulf (2008), which study the organizational
eﬀects of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). For Canada, which as the smaller
member country would be expected to have experienced the largest price changes, Breinlich
documents a signiﬁcant increase in the level of merger activity following CUSFTA; in the U.S.,
the corresponding eﬀects were much smaller. Guadalupe and Wulf (2008), in their sample of
U.S. ﬁrms, nevertheless ﬁnd considerable evidence of reorganizations on a smaller scale, such as
changes in reporting structures and in the type of executive compensation schemes. Since the
U.S. would have experienced smaller price changes than Canada in the wake of CUSFTA, this
is what our model would lead us to expect.15
4 Factor Market Liberalization
The analysis carried out in the previous section focused on the organizational responses to price
changes triggered by the removal of barriers in product markets, in a setting in which input
suppliers did not move across countries. In this section, we assume that product markets are
fully liberalized (so that product prices are determined by (12)-(13) above) and focus on the
organizational eﬀects of factor market liberalization. “Factor mobility” here means that supplier
ﬁrms are allowed to cross borders. This can take the form of A ﬁrms moving, Bi ﬁrms moving,
or both. It is worth noting that Bi’s remain immobile across sectors.
Cross-country movements of the sectorally-mobile factor of production, A suppliers, can
broadly be interpreted as migration ﬂows,16 while movements of the speciﬁc factors, the Bi’s,
can capture the oﬀshoring of some production processes.
15For example, our model would predict smaller price changes and less dramatic restructuring in Home, if this
were endowed with a larger measure of Bi suppliers (nB > n∗
B) and a proportionally larger population.
16Notice, however, that in our model there are no workers moving independently of production units.
164.1 Organizational change
Consider ﬁrst trading economies characterized by similar factor markets. This is the scenario
depicted in Figure 3, in which the range at which integration occurs is the same in the two
countries, i.e., ˆ α = ˆ α∗. This implies that in both countries integration will be the prevailing form





will be chosen at all other prices. Since under free trade pi = p∗
i = pw
i , in this case, factor market
integration will have no impact on organizational choices. Therefore, once product markets are
integrated, we should expect factor market liberalization to have little eﬀect on organizational
choices in trading economies characterized by similar factor markets (e.g., France and Germany,
or the United States and Europe).
Consider next a scenario in which Home and Foreign diﬀer in terms of their factor markets
(e.g., West and East Europe, or the United States and China). For simplicity, assume that the
total endowment of B ﬁrms is the same in the two countries (i.e., nB = n∗
B), but the Home
country’s productivity distribution of A suppliers in the numeraire sector strictly stochastically
dominates the corresponding distribution for the Foreign country, i.e., F(α) > F ∗(α), whenever
F and F ∗ are not both 0 or 1.





w) = nB + n
∗
B, (15)
where αw is the equilibrium return for all A ﬁrms matched with B ﬁrms. Hence factor liber-
alization leads to the convergence in the terms of trade between suppliers across countries. In




will also be the same for the two
countries.
Figure 4 below can be used to illustrate factor market equilibria with and without factor
mobility. In the no-mobility case, A suppliers in the Home country obtain a higher surplus when
matched with B’s than do matched A’s in the Foreign country, i.e., ˆ α > ˆ α∗. Following the
removal of barriers to factor mobility, the integrated matching market will clear when condition
(15) above is satisﬁed. The equilibrium return to all A ﬁrms matched with B ﬁrms will be given
by αw, with ˆ α∗ < αw < ˆ α.
Notice that convergence in factor prices can be achieved through (i) the relocation of some A’s
from Foreign to Home, (ii) the relocation of some B’s from Home to Foreign, or a combination
of both. In Figure 4, channel (i) is captured by the distribution function 1
2(F(α)+F ∗(α)), while
channel (ii) is captured by shifts in nB and n∗
B.
Channel (i) captures the process of oﬀshoring some production units to developing countries,
e.g., the relocation of some high tech ﬁrms from the US to India, to exploit lower costs of IT
services there. Channel (ii) captures instead international migration ﬂows, e.g., the relocation
of Indian IT suppliers to the United States, to take advantage of higher returns. Our analysis
17suggests that oﬀshoring (i.e., the move of B’s from Home to Foreign) and immigration (i.e., the
move of A’s from Foreign to Home) are substitutes. Interestingly, allowing immigration may
limit the need for domestic ﬁrms to locate production activities abroad.
Our model predicts that factor market liberalization will tend to hurt A suppliers in Home
(whose return falls from ˆ α to αw) and beneﬁt A suppliers in Foreign (whose return increases
from ˆ α∗ to αw). This is because factor mobility allows B suppliers in Home to replace domestic
A suppliers with cheaper foreign suppliers. In line with frequently voiced concerns, our analysis
suggests that both international migration and oﬀshoring will tend to hurt workers in more

















Figure 4: Pre- and post-liberalization equilibria in the factor markets
In Section 2.4, we have shown that an increase in ˆ α leads to an decrease in the range of prices
for which integration is chosen (Lemma 1). It follows that before factor market liberalization,
in every sector i, the range of prices for which integration is chosen is smaller in Home country









Figure 5 below shows the eﬀects of the factor market integration on organization choices in a
sector i ∈ {m + 1,...,I} in which the Home country is an exporter. The removal of barriers to
factor mobility implies that the “integration range” expands in Home and is reduced in Foreign,





Factor mobility can trigger substantial changes in ownership structure. For example, in the
case depicted in Figure 5, prior to factor market liberalization, ﬁrms are non-integrated in both
Home and Foreign; after liberalization, there is a wave of mergers in the industry as ﬁrms in
both countries to switch to integration. Notice that this restructuring is associated with a price
18increase (see discussion in the next subsection).
While factor liberalization leads to mergers in some industries, in others, it may lead to
outsourcing (a switch from integration to non-integration). Figure 6 below shows the eﬀects of
the liberalization of factor markets in a sector i ∈ {1,...,m} in which the Home country is an
importer. As in Figure 5, the removal of barriers to factor mobility implies that the integration
range expands in the Home country and is reduced in the Foreign country. As a result, supplier
ﬁrms located in Foreign will move from integration to non-integration.
Notice that, in contrast to the removal of barriers to trade in goods—which generates sector-
speciﬁc eﬀects on organization by aﬀecting product prices—the removal of barriers between factor
markets aﬀects all sectors in the economy, by changing the equilibrium surplus of matched A
suppliers. Also, the type of organizational restructuring should be independent of the speciﬁc
patterns of factor mobility, i.e., diﬀerent factor movements have the same impact on the terms
of trade prevailing in supplier markets and on organizational choices.17 It follows that
Proposition 2 By changing the terms of trade between suppliers, factor market liberalization
can induce widespread restructuring. The resulting organizational choices are independent of the
speciﬁc patterns of factor mobility.
This result suggests that countries that have already experienced organizational changes as
a result of the elimination of barriers to trade in goods (e.g., EU member countries after the
Customs Union formation in 1968) are likely to undergo further restructuring as a result of
the removal of barriers to factor mobility (e.g., increased M&A activities across EU members,
following the establishment of the Single Market, as documented by the study of the European
Commission, 1996). Such reorganizational (as distinct from relocational) activities18 will be
more intense between countries with large productivity diﬀerences (e.g., Germany and Romania)
rather than among those with similar productivity levels (e.g., Germany and France).
4.2 Consumer welfare
The analysis carried out above shows that factor liberalization can lead to changes in ﬁrms’
ownership structure, by aﬀecting the division of surplus between managers of diﬀerent supplier
17To verify this, compare the case in which only the sectorally-mobile factor of production (A suppliers) moves
across countries with the case in which only the speciﬁc factors (Bi suppliers) relocate. In the ﬁrst case, A ﬁrms
move from Foreign to Home until all matched A’s obtain the same return αw; in the second case, Bi suppliers
move from Home to Foreign, until the price they have to pay to A suppliers is equal to αw in both countries.
18There is nothing in the model to prevent “re-partnering” after liberalization: reorganization may involve a
Bi supplier integrating with an A supplier, which may be diﬀerent from the one it had dealt with at arm’s length































































Figure 6: Liberalization of factor markets (b)
2
1ﬁrms. In the remaining of this section, we will examine the consequences of these changes from
the point of view of consumers.19
In our model of organization design, consumers have an interest in ﬁrms’ ownership structure.
To see this, consider again Figure 2 above and notice that we can distinguish two regions: one of
eﬃcient integration (the portion of the supply curve comprised between p(ˆ α) and ˜ p, in which ﬁrms
that choose to be integrated produce more than what they would by remaining non-integrated;
and one of ineﬃcient integration (the portion of the supply curve comprised between ˜ p and p(ˆ α),
in which output is smaller under integration than it would be if ﬁrms were non-integrated. Thus
in our setup changes in organization structure can have an impact on consumer surplus.
As shown in Figures 5-6 above, the liberalization of factor markets can trigger changes in
ownership structure which lead to a fall in world supply and to a price increase. Consider ﬁrst
the case in which factor liberalization leads to switch to ineﬃcient integration in the Home
country (depicted in Figure 5). This can occur if pw
i is initially just above p(ˆ α); then following
liberalization, Home’s integration range expands, its supply falls as its ﬁrms merge, and the
new equilibrium price is higher than pw
i . Alternatively, the price increase could result from
a move away from eﬃcient integration to ineﬃcient outsourcing in the Foreign country (the
case depicted in Figure 6). This can occur if pw
i is initially just above p(ˆ α∗); then following
liberalization, Foreign’s integration range shrinks, its supply falls as its ﬁrms divest, and the
new equilibrium price must again be higher than pw
i .20
To sum up, assuming that factor liberalization does not lead to a reversal of the trade pat-
terns, ineﬃcient reorganization always occurs in a country’s export sector. In Home, ineﬃciencies
result from mergers between suppliers, while in Foreign they are associated with outsourcing.
We can thus state the following:
Proposition 3 Factor market liberalization can trigger a shift toward ineﬃcient integration in
Home and ineﬃcient outsourcing in Foreign.
Proof: Appendix.
Though systematic evidence corresponding to the eﬀects of organizational changes on product
prices does not yet appear to have been assembled, there is at least some indicative evidence of
phenomena corresponding the price increases following reorganization that we have discussed.
In particular, there are numerous accounts of falling product quality resulting (especially) from
cross-border reorganization (see discussion below). Our model can be easily reinterpreted to
explain such accounts. One can interpret the “quantity” produced by a ﬁrm as quality under
money-back guarantees or threat of lost repeat business: the good either delivers the consumer
19See Legros and Newman (2008) for a more general welfare analysis, which also takes account of managerial
costs. The eﬀects on consumer welfare discussed here generally apply as well to such broader welfare measures.
20As shown in the Appendix (proof of Proposition 3), factor liberalization may also lead to an increase in world
supply and a price decrease, or leave aggregate quantities and prices unchanged.
22a positive value with probability QN(pi) (under non-integration, else QI(pi)) or nothing. Low
success probability corresponds to low quality. Thus instead of QN(pi)ni goods delivered with
probability 1, we have ni goods of quality QN(pi).
As we have remarked, it is possible that in our model a Home export good produced under
eﬃcient non-integration prior to factor market liberalization would be produced, following lib-
eralization, under (ineﬃcient) integration. This is indeed the case depicted in Figure 5. The
success probability falls (since aggregate output is falling), corresponding to a fall in quality.
This ﬁnding is in line with evidence on the ineﬃciencies of the recent wave of M&A activities
(e.g., Langebeer, 2003). For example, a recent survey of American, European, and Japanese
executives, 50-60% of respondents admit that mergers were responsible for signiﬁcant supply
disruptions, product launch delays, and quality and service problems (Accenture, 2007).
The case of a move to ineﬃcient outsourcing depicted by Figure 6 could instead be illustrated
by the safety problems associated with American-designed toys assembled in China. In August
2007, Mattel recalled 19 million Chinese-made toys from the world market because of safety
fears relating to lead paint and small magnets that can be shaken loose and swallowed by
children. The cause of these problems has been attributed to the fact that various tasks that
were previously performed in factories owned and operated by Mattel had been outsourced
to Chinese contractors and sub-contractors (The New York Times, August 15, 2007). More
systematic evidence is provided by Lin and Ma (2008), who ﬁnd that Korea’s experiment with
service outsourcing for the period 1985-2001 lead to a decline in productivity.
Proposition 3 shows that, even in a setting in which ﬁrms have no market power, allowing
suppliers to relocate freely across countries can negatively aﬀect consumers by inducing ineﬃcient
organizational changes that lead to price increases (quality losses). A stronger result can also
be derived (proof in Appendix):
Proposition 4 Factor market liberalization may reduce consumer welfare in both countries.
To see this, notice that factor liberalization leads to a more eﬃcient allocation of A suppliers
across countries, resulting in a beneﬁcial increase in aggregate production of the numeraire good:
in the Home country, the surplus derived by A ﬁrms in the production of i good falls from ˆ α
to αw, leading some A suppliers to switch to the production of good 0; the opposite happens
in the Foreign country. It can easily be shown that the overall eﬀect is an increase in world
production of the numeraire good, which is beneﬁcial to consumers in both countries. This
is because more eﬃcient A ﬁrms from Home replace less eﬃcient foreign ﬁrms. However, the
increase in production may be quite small, depending on the distribution functions F and F ∗
(see Appendix), in which case the impact that factor liberalization has on consumer welfare
depends mainly on its eﬀects on the prices of the i goods.
235 Empirical Implications
In Sections 3 and 4 above, we have examined the organizational responses of ﬁrms facing the
successive liberalization of product and factor markets. These “waves” of trade liberalization
should lead to waves of organizational restructuring, where both ﬁrm boundaries and contractual
relations within ﬁrms will change.
Our analysis also suggests that “deep integration” — the full liberalization of product and
factor markets — should result in the convergence of ﬁrms’ ownership structure across countries
and within industries. The speciﬁc type of ownership structure to which a liberalized industry
will converge depends on demand and supply conditions prevailing in that industry, as well as
on the terms of trade in supplier markets, which determines the range of prices for which vertical
integration is chosen over outsourcing. This result implies, for example, that we should observe
convergence of organizational choices within industries across members of the European Union
(EU), which have eliminated barriers to both commodity trade and factor mobility.
To assess the validity of this prediction, we have started to explore how the degree of economic
integration between countries aﬀects the extent to which these countries have similar ownership
structures at the industry level. In particular, we have focused on the comparison between EU
members and the Unites States. To measure the extent of vertical integration in a given industry,
we have employed the coeﬃcients constructed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2008) using
information from WorldBase, a database of public and private companies in more than 200
countries and territories.21 We have obtained these coeﬃcients for the Unites States and for 13
EU member countries22 for 77 BEA-deﬁned industries.
We would expect the degree of integration of product and factor markets to be higher between
any pair of EU countries than between a European country and the US, due to both lower
transport costs and policy barriers. Our model would thus predict that the diﬀerence in the
vertical integration measure of a given industry between any two EU countries should be smaller
than the corresponding diﬀerence between any EU country and the US. We have thus performed
the following simple regression: |vij − vik| = β1DUS +ǫijk, where vij and vik are the measures of
vertical integration of industry i in countries j and k, and DUS is a dummy that equals one if one
of the countries in the pair is the United States. Our estimations show a positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient for β1.23 This provides some preliminary evidence for the hypothesis that countries
21WorldBase reports the four-digit SIC code of the primary Industry in which each ﬁrm operates, and for some
countries the SIC codes of up to ﬁve secondary codes listed in descending order of importance. Acemoglu, Johnson
and Mitton (2008) use the 1992 US input-output tables to calculate the opportunity for vertical integration for
every pair of industries, by computing the dollar value of one industry required to produce a dollar’s worth of
the other industry. They then combine this information with ﬁrm data from WorldBase for the year 2002, to
construct ﬁrm-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc measures of vertical integration.
22These are all the European countries that were EU members in 2002, excluding France and Greece, for which
the vertical integration indexes could not be constructed due to lack of information on secondary industries in
which ﬁrms are active.
23In our regressions, we have included sector ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors clustered by country pair,
24that are more integrated in goods and factor markets have more similar organizational structures
in a given sector. However, a more careful analysis is clearly warranted to check the robustness
of this result, and more empirical work is needed to explore the eﬀects of trade liberalization on
ﬁrms’ organizational choices.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have embedded organizational ﬁrms into a standard model of international
trade in order to examine eﬀects of the liberalization of product and factor markets on ﬁrm
boundaries and other aspects of organization. Falling trade costs will have a signiﬁcant impact
on organizational design, though the direction of change is not generally monotonic. Nor are these
changes always eﬃcient: even full liberalization may reduce consumer welfare in the presence
of organizational ﬁrms. The “building-block” model of the ﬁrm in our setup emphasizes one
important trade-oﬀ inﬂuencing organizational choice (coordination vs. specialization), and yields
a particularly tractable model. Other building blocks (e.g., partnerships, hold up, or costly
communication) could be used. At their broadest level, our results would be unaﬀected. But
details do matter, and investigating the eﬀects of trade liberalization in the presence of these
other organizational trade-oﬀs is an important avenue for future research.
We conclude by brieﬂy discussing some of the policy implications of our analysis. In the
standard competitive trade model, moving to full product and factor market liberalization will
maximize consumer welfare. Not so in the present model, which diﬀers from the standard one
only by the presence of organizational ﬁrms, where managers set the ﬁrm’s boundaries and design
its compensation schemes. One implication is that optimal trade policy is likely to diﬀer from the
standard one in the presence of organizational ﬁrms. For instance, there may be a positive role for
production or export subsidies to countervail the eﬀects of ineﬃcient organizational choices. In
the post-factor-market liberalization situation depicted in Figure 6, a small subsidy may induce
an exporting ﬁrm’s managers to switch from (ineﬃcient) non-integration to (eﬃcient) integration
by eﬀectively raising the revenue generated by exporting (in a higher price range, gains from a
subsidy could also be made if it encouraged an ineﬃciently integrated ﬁrm to divest).
The analysis also suggests that policies that more directly address organizational ineﬃcien-
cies may complement trade policy. The model of ﬁrms’ organizational design described in the
paper is most descriptive of “family ﬁrms,” or other closely-held organizations in which the
primary decision makers have high ﬁnancial stakes. The model could easily be adjusted to de-
scribe “managerial ﬁrms,” in which the primary decision makers have low ﬁnancial stakes. For
instance, suppose the suppliers’ managers receive only a small fraction λ of the revenues, with
the remainder accruing to outside shareholders who nevertheless have little control over major
and excluded industry coeﬃcients constructed with very few ﬁrm observations. The estimated coeﬃcient on β1
was always positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
25organizational decisions. In this setting, it is straightforward to show that managers will decide




, a much broader range of product prices
than in the case considered above (for which λ was equal to 1). In turn, this will increase the
range of prices for which the ineﬃcient forms of integration and non-integration would be chosen
by the managers.
Shareholders’ interests will now diverge from those of their managers: typically, they will
prefer higher output levels than their managers do. This is because shareholders are unconcerned
with the managers’ private costs, but value revenue (and since they are competitive, they have
no interest in reducing output). In particular, their interests may be more aligned with those of
consumers (who obviously favor high output) than with those of managers.24
Consider a corporate governance policy that eﬀectively gives shareholders greater control over
organization design decisions (or compare countries with “good corporate governance” or “strong
shareholder protection” to those without). It is easy to show that this policy would reduce the
likelihood that factor liberalization leads to a price increase and thus to a loss in consumer
surplus.25 Moreover, goods market liberalization now becomes more eﬀective: it is clear that
such liberalization can only be consumer-welfare enhancing in our model; however, the gains from
trade liberalization would be larger still if organization were always chosen to maximize output
rather than managerial welfare. Our analysis thus suggests a potential complementarity between
trade policy and corporate governance policy. From this point of view, it is not surprising that
the European Commission has put forward an Action Plan on corporate governance, which is
meant to to “strengthen shareholders’ rights” and to “foster the eﬃciency and competitiveness
of business, with special attention to some speciﬁc cross-border issues” (see Commission press
release, May 21 2003).
Appendix
A.1 Full Employment Equilibrium
To ensure existence of a full employment equilibrium for both Home and Foreign (and therefore
for the integrated world economy), deﬁne p0(ˆ α) to be the lowest price at which an A can obtain
the surplus ˆ α under non-integration: W N(1,p0(ˆ α)) =
p0(ˆ α)2
1+p0(ˆ α) = ˆ α. Note this equation has a
unique solution, increasing in ˆ α. Thus, p0(ˆ α) > p0(ˆ α∗). Moreover, the solution is independent
of the sector, and it follows from Assumption 1 that p0(ˆ α) < p(ˆ α), so that Non-integration
dominates Integration at p0(ˆ α). We simply require that there is excess demand for good i at
24However, there are limits to this alliance of interests (see Legros and Newman, 2008).
25Compared to the case in which managers with low ﬁnancial stakes decide on the ﬁrms’ ownership structure,
integration of supplier markets will now be chosen for some prices below p(ˆ α)/λ and non-integration for some
prices in (˜ p/λ,p(ˆ α)/λ), raising output. Generally, “hostile” takeovers and divestitures will occur at the expense
of Bi suppliers (the A’s must still receive a surplus that satisﬁes (15)).
26p0(ˆ α), so that the equilibrium price must exceed p0(ˆ α) and there is full employment of Bi’s. For
this let Vi = max{ni,n∗
i}. We then impose
Assumption 2 For all i ∈ {1,...,I}, u
′
i(ViQN(p0(ˆ α))) > p0(ˆ α).
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
















It is easily checked that g(pi) is continuous (in fact, diﬀerentiable), strictly concave, vanishes at
p and ¯ p, and is therefore single-peaked.





(1 + pi + 2s(1 − s)) ≤ pi(1 − σ) −
1
2






((2 + pi)s − s2) = α, is the proﬁt share that guarantees A
a payoﬀ of α under non-integration: integration is chosen only if pi ∈ PI (ˆ α). Equivalently, we
need
2s(1 − s) ≤ g(pi). (16)
Now, Assumption 1 ensures that s ∈ [0,1/2] for any equilibrium ˆ α; 2s(1 − s) is increasing on
[0,1/2]; and from (8), s is increasing in A’s payoﬀ. Thus (16) is satisﬁed if and only if ˆ α ≤ h(pi),
where h(·) is a continuous, increasing transformation of g(·) with h(p) = h(¯ p). Since g is single-
peaked, so is h and therefore its upper contour sets are convex. Since PI (ˆ α) is the ˆ α-upper
contour set of h, PI (ˆ α) can be written as [p(ˆ α), ¯ p(ˆ α)].
(ii) Since s increases with ˆ α, and W N(s,pi) increases in s on [0,1/2], W N(s,pi) increases in
ˆ α. It follows that PI (ˆ α) is decreasing, i.e., that p(ˆ α) is increasing and ¯ p(ˆ α) is decreasing.
Remark. The function g(p) (and therefore h(p)) used in the proof achieves a maximum at
a unique point ˇ p, which is the (closed-form) solution to a simple cubic equation. Clearly ˇ p is
contained in [p(ˆ α), ¯ p(ˆ α)] when it is non-empty. For σ small enough to ensure non-emptiness of
[p, ¯ p], ˇ p is very nearly equal to (1/σ)1/3, which is smaller than (1/σ)1/2−1 = ˜ p. Thus, ˜ p > p(ˆ α).
The condition for ˜ p < ¯ p(ˆ α) is slightly more stringent, but will generally be satisﬁed if either σ
or ˆ α is not too large.
27Proof of Proposition 3
Factor market liberalization has the following eﬀects on product prices:
A price increase if
p(ˆ α∗) < pw
i < p(αw), i ∈ {1,...,m};
or p(ˆ α) < pw
i < p(αw), i ∈ {m + 1,...,I};
A price decrease if
p(αw) < pw
i < p(ˆ α∗), i ∈ {1,...,m};
or p(αw) < pw
i < p(ˆ α), i ∈ {m + 1,...,I};








i < p(ˆ α∗);
pw
i > p(ˆ α∗).
Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 3 shows that, even in a setting in which ﬁrms have no market power, allowing
suppliers to relocate freely across countries can negatively aﬀect consumers by inducing ineﬃcient
organizational changes. However, factor liberalization also leads to a more eﬃcient allocation
of A suppliers across countries, resulting in a beneﬁcial increase in aggregate production of the
numeraire good 0. In what follows, we derive a suﬃcient condition for factor market liberalization
to hurt consumers in both countries.
Recall that ni (n∗
i) denotes the measure of Bi ﬁrms in Home (Foreign) and that
PI





B. Let us assume that nB = n∗
B = n and that ni + n∗
i = 2n/I, ∀i. This
guarantees that the world supply is the same across sectors. We also assume that all sectors
have the same aggregate demand. Together, these assumptions imply that the price changes and
the welfare eﬀects of factor liberalization will be the same in all sectors of the economy. Using
the proof of Proposition 3, we can then identify conditions such that the equilibrium world price
will strictly increases after factor market integration. Let L > 0 be the resulting loss in welfare.
Let αw = 1
2(ˆ α + ˆ α∗), where F(ˆ α) = F ∗(ˆ α∗) = n and F(αw) + F ∗(αw) = 2n. That is, before
factor market liberalization A suppliers have outside options ˆ α and ˆ α∗ in Home and Foreign,
respectively, while they have outside option αw after the liberalization.
Now, since ˆ α > αw > ˆ α∗, some Home A suppliers that before liberalization were employed
in the production of I goods will start producing the numeraire good; at the same time, some
28Foreign A suppliers that were originally producing the numeraire good will start producing the
other goods.









integrating by parts and using the equilibrium conditions F(ˆ α) = n, F ∗(ˆ α∗) = n and F(αw) +






















w − ˆ α
∗) + (n − F(α
w))(ˆ α − α
w) (17)
and since αw = 1







w))(ˆ α − ˆ α
∗). (18)
Consider two distribution functions F ∗(x;ǫ),F(x;ǫ) that are linear on the interval [ˆ α∗, ˆ α] and
that satisfy F ∗(ˆ α;ǫ) = n + ǫ and F(ˆ α∗;ǫ) = n − ǫ. Since there is no restriction on F(x;ǫ) and
on F ∗(x;ǫ) outside the interval [ˆ α∗, ˆ α], as ǫ varies it is possible to ﬁnd ‘completions’ of these
functions such that the overall distributions are indeed distribution functions.
By construction, F ∗(αw;ǫ) − F(αw;ǫ) = ǫ. Therefore, by (17), for all ǫ < 2L/(ˆ α − ˆ α∗), the
welfare loss resulting from the increase in the price of all i-goods more than oﬀsets the welfare
gain associated with increased consumption of the numeraire good.
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